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目　錄

How Can Taiwan Studies Contribute to Political Science

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Editor's Note: The following is a transcription of a roundtable on "How Can Taiwan Studies Contribute to Political Science". The session is part of the program organized by the American Political Science Association Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) for the 1991 APSA annual meeting in Washington D.C. The roundtable was chaired by Professor Andrew Nathan of Columbia University. The panelists include Dr. Edwin Winckler of Columbia University. Professor Chi Huang of the University of Kentucky and Professor Steve Chan of the University of Colorado. The roundtable was held at Washington Hilton and Tower on the 30th of August, 1991. The following text is transcribed by Wu Jieh-ming and Hsu Szu-chien of Columbia University and edited by Professor Yun-han Chu, the program organizer. The bracketed comments were added by the editor. Dr Edwin Winckler prepares a memo after the meeting, which is attached to the text here.

Andrew Nathan [Chairman]:

Yun-han is the guiding spirit of this session...I am happy to perform the functions of... "figurehead". Our topic is about how Taiwan studies can contribute to the political science. We have a

formal division of labor between us. Each speaker will use fifteen minutes. I would like to ask Edwin Winckler to start, then go to steve Chan, and then to Huang Chi.

Edward Winckler:

** [Insert Winckler's transcript here] **

Steve Chan:

I appreciate your attendance in such an early section. I am going to talk about international relations, specifically of two issues. First, the state of art in the studies of Taiwan's international relations. Second, how, or to what extent, knowledge derived from this case can contribute to our understanding of international relations generally. Given these purposes, my comments will be more directed to analytical leverage of the Taiwan case rather than the substantive findings from it. I have less interest in addressing the intrinsic, substantive values of Taiwan as opposed to its cross-national implications and theoretical relevance. I must also say, as a preliminary remark, I will be taking a short cut, I will be engaged in illustrative rather than demonstrative arguments. And finally I will be guilty of some caricatures.

After all, theories of international relations are a big topic. Therefore, with regard to the first issue, to be bloody-minded, I will address them in several simplified points to save time. They are about the prevailing intellectual proclivities of the people

who work in this area. I should also say these proclivities are equally applicable to international relations researches in general. That is, they are generic to the field as a whole, and not unique to the studies of Taiwan per se. The first proclivity is, the predominant conception in the study of international relations still remains one of national security defined in terms of military and political matters. That is not to deny that concerns with economic statecraft, economic competition, and industrial adjustment have received increased attention. But none the less in terms of relative balance, (the key word is relative balance,) we are still hanging on a conception of the international relations which seems to be somewhat outdated, more suited for an era of Cold War, political competition, ideological rivalry, and attempts to safeguard what is conceived as national security in terms of military denial of capabilities.

Number two, much of the studies in this area implicitly or explicitly use a definition of national power that relies on "stock-taking," by which I mean power is defined in terms of how much tangible assets a country has. By tangible assets, I mean the size of population, the size of territory, the number of tanks. In this conception, the system has a hierarchy, then a country is assigned to a position in this hierarchy. And the assignment of position is dependent on proprietary possession of these resources. Emphasis is put on the proprietary possession because less attention goes to the manner in which a country goes

about operationalizing what it has. The key here is having them as opposed to how to make use of the resources you have. I will go back to this point later on.

The third prevailing tendency is that international relations still are very much dependent on the conception of a "billiard-ball" approach to analyze countries. Countries somehow mechanically bound each other like billiard balls. And this is clearly very prominent in the studies of Taiwan's international relations. Many books and topics address in terms of R.O.C. and Japan, R.O.C. and U.S.A., R.O.C. and P.R.C.

Number four, these relations are defined primarily, oftentimes even exclusively, in terms of official interactions. That is to say, less attention has gone to mass politics, attitudinal changes, and cultural interactions.

Fifth, much of the research has been based on the verbal statements, especially official statements, as they are revealed through the press. I would say that 60 or 70 percent of the work is based on the qualitative content analysis of statements that are made by X or Y. What I am trying to allude to is there is very little differentiation between words and deeds, and much of the work is dependent on the analysis of the words, qualitative content analysis as revealed through official presses especially. Again, this is not unique to Taiwan studies, but one look across the strait, some knowledge is still very much dependent on analysis of media statements.

I would also argue there is a tendency to rely on "great man" theories. Deng says this, or Gorbachev says that. This tendency, at relative expense of less exciting and more anonymous analysis of statistics, is very much the emphasis of what does X or Y or Z think.

Another tendency is that, in attending to big events that break trends and that suggest a shock and discontinuity, much of the attention is post hoc. Efforts tend to go into catching the nut with the most recent twist, or turn, as opposed to an anticipatory analysis.

What do these proclivities mean? I would suggest, by being bloody-minded about it, that they much better suit a world of the bygone-years, where countries are lined up on two sides, where military affairs and poltics do occupy the center stage, and where there is much more hierarchy in national status. These conceptions will serve us less well in an area of complex and interdependence -- as defined by Keohane and Nye [1977, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Harvard University Press] -- where military forces recede from the forefront, and the military capability is no longer gonig to be fungible, where agenda definition and issue linkage play a much more prominent role in international relations, and where a country's ability to engage in cross-national coalition will matter far more.

Now specifically, let me say a few words about to what

extent can relations in general, and particularly, in some of the areas of short force, if you will, that I have alluded to before. I think the Taiwan case actually offers a number of very exciting opportunities to address some of this short force, or maybe imbalance in our analytical attention. Specifically, let me just cite a few. The issues of change versus statics, continuity versus break. The predominant emphasis is still with historical legacies, continuity and soon. Yet, Taiwan offers a very exciting case as to how a country can change; how elite opinion can change. Just a few examples. We have here a Leninist party that is going through, slowly but surely, self-reformation or self-transformation. In another example, how can a country climb the international product cycle to defy some of the predestination arguments suggested by dependency theory? This is just an example of continuity versus change.

Another area where the Taiwan study can really contribute to the theories would be what I call state versus private sectors. Earlier on, I suggested that much of the attention has been based on the qualitative analysis of the elite statement and official statements. Yet, looking at the events in Germany leading to German reunification and recent events in Soviet Union, I think there has been a massive change in terms of attitudinal change, and cultural change among the people of Taiwan -- their attitudes about the role of Taiwan in international community and possibility of reunification of China. Yet, I think, we as a com-

munity, have not paid enough attention. Our efforts have been very much focused on the elite interaction--this spokesman says, that spokesman says--without paying enough attention to what some of survey research techniques can tell us about; what is happening underneath the surface of elite interaction. That, I think, is a very exciting thing. I would agree that much of the work has been done in the area of economics, has tended to dichotomize state versus market. And I think this is a false dichotomy.

Yet, a third area is, how a country can utilize its structural position and then try to maximize this structural position via process management. Earlier on, I said the tendency has been very much to assign a country position on the basis of how much tangible resources it has. I would argue that Taiwan has been able to do very well internationally, in part because it has engaged not in bilateral relations, but multilateral relations. One of the ways it tries to promote itself in this specific position is in effect to tie itself in a network of relations, so that any disturbance to this network will create ripple effects. It is important that Taiwan has been very effective in engaging unofficial diplomacy, for example, the opening of trade offices across various major areas in the U.S. and countries in Europe. It is interesting how a country can try to overcome its diplomatic isolation through unconventional means. Another example is the China lobby in earlier days. That is a classic example of what Keohane and Nye

would call cross-national and sub-national coalition game.

My basic point is that much of the prevailing conception of international relations still is very much focused on structural position where a country is assigned. There is not enough attention paid to the process management. The best way I can describe the distinction I am trying to draw is the game of programming. The predominant way in the international relations is to say how good are the cards you have in your hand; how strong a hand you have been endowed with by history, or by your luck. My argument is that winning at a program table is not strictly dependent on the hand you are endowed with. Your skill in playing this hand matters as well. Process mangement, in the sense of defining agenda and linking issues to create winning coalition at the sub-national level, matters as well. Here, I think, the Taiwan case has a lot to suggest.

Let me conclude by making one final comment, in the sense of heuristic value that Taiwan case can offer us. Try to imagine a two by two table, in which the alleged course, the presence and absence of it is the one axis, and the alleged outome, the presence and absence of it is the one axis, and the alleged outcome, the pressence and absence, is the other row of the table. Psychologists tell us that as human beings, we are all fallible, and that we all tend to be biased in our attention to that one particular cell whereby the presence of the alleged outcome co-occur. We pay far too much attention to the occurrence of the expected. Mean-

while, we pay far less attention to the non-occurrence of the expected, That is to say, the other cell whereby the alleged course is absent whereas the outcome is present. At the same time, we do not pay enough attention to the non-occurrence of the expected and the occurrence of the unexpected.# [That is to say, the other two cells whereby the alleged course is absent but the outcome is present, and whereby the course is present but the alleged outcome is absent.]

I think, the case of Taiwan presents us with some very interesting political economy arguments about why the mouse drowses or why the dog fails to bark. In a sense, the Kuhnian definition of scientific progress, the analysis of a deviant case is very important. We should make a self-conscious effort to redress imbalance of our attention. I conclude by telling you a story about a drunk man looking for his key outside the local bar. After looking for his key for a while, his friend comes by, and said: "Are you sure you lost your key here?" The drunk man replied, "No, I am not sure I lost the key here, but the light is there." Well, this story is usually told in such a facetious way as to mark the folly of the drunk person. I will argue that, if one is unsure where the key is if we really do not know where the theoretical answer is. Certainly it is much smarter to look for where the light is better, as opposed to look for where the light is not so good. And I am suggesting that in a number of ways Taiwan does provide this light, although it is no guarantee that it will offer

the solution.

Nathan: Thank You. Excellent!
Now Professor Huang.

Huang Chi:

It is my pleasure to have a chance to give my view on how Taiwan studies can contribute to political science. Imagine if I raise the question to my American colleagues of how the studies of American politics can contribute to political science. I guess most of my colleagues' responses would be: what kind of question is that?! But to some extent this seems a legitimate question to ask of those people studying outside of U.S., particularly studying Third World countries and small countries like Taiwan. In the following, I will try to present some of my own ideas. Beyond this, I am not sure if I am qualified to assess the state of art and to identify some cuttingedge research topics. Facing so many experts sitting besides me, I venture to outline some of the current research that I have read and to identify some potential topics for the near future.

To begin with, I will talk about some research methods. When people come to the studies of Taiwan, just as in studying other countries or areas, we can always easily identify at least three approaches. First, to treat the country as an interesting case per se. This kind of case study may be historical, and mayin volve inter-disciplinary research. It usually provides atremen

dous amount of detailed information. A second type of research is to treat Taiwan not so much as a case per se, but as a critical case in (Harry) Eckstein's sense [1975, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science", in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol.7]. That is, there is some theoratical context in which it seeks to identify Taiwan as an interesting case either to verify or to falsify some kind of theoretical argument. It is usually not focused on detailed information, but on theoretical context instead. The third approach is slightly different in that it treats Taiwan as a case to compare with, it may involve a small number of countries either of most similar or most different systems, following Przeworski and Teune's tradition [1970, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry]. A more recent approach such as "Bollen logic" approach may also be adopted. All these approaches seek to situate Taiwan in a system, to compare it with other entities for sorting out some common patterns of relationships among different variables.

The latitudinal approach is, of course, much closer to comparative politics tradition. We also know that in much broader comparative politics ideas, Taiwan may be treated as one in a group of fifty or a hundred countries in those variables-oriented theoretical building approaches. People use all these different approaches when they include Taiwan as part of their researches. It is very difficult to tell which approach is better. It is probably premature to make that kind of judgement.

With regard to different sub-fields, such as development theory, IPE, and international relations, they are closely related to different research approaches. There are potential conflicts among the different approaches. I remember reading a book about military and security issues in Taiwan, the author begins his first chapter by stating that almost everything about the ROC on Taiwan as a Third World country is singular. Not only has its economic development been unique among the LDCs, but its security environment has been exceptional. Here I would like to underline the three words: singular, unique, and exceptional. of course, these help emphasize that Taiwan is an interesting case per se. But I would guess tha the author would probably be skeptical of Taiwan being a potential case for comparative studies, when put into a broader theoretical context. Admittedly, every country is unique if you go into certain level of details. To some extent, it is also true of the United States. That is the reason why I believe it is legitimate to ask how the studies of American politics can contribute to political science. But that does not mean we have to be overwhelmed by those details, which are unique to each country. Still, we can try to place the case of Taiwan in a broader context. Therefore, let me go to the subfield of development theory. If we just look at recent development in Taiwan, the topic, which some people have already contributed to, is the democratic system. But it is fair to say that recent development is moving away from hard authoritarianism

towards a softer authoritarianism. Hopefully, it is moving towards a semidemocratic system. Put in another way, at least, it is moving toward a new mode of accommodating socio-economic interests. This new mode is more open to the general public than ever.

Under this broader topic of democratization, we may ask why Chiang Ching-Kuo, starting from the early eighties, decided to loosen--slowly but steadily--his control, which paved the way for greater political reform after his death. We should go beyond this paricular time period and try to look at what prompts a dictator to move towards the new mode of accommodating different interests. After his death, the division between the ruling party and an emerging opposition party also becomes a quite interesting topic to study. During this process of divistion, what is the role of those more conservative forces such as the military and security forces which used to enjoy a fair amount of autonomy? How do they situate themselves? Are they likely to further develop their role in this recently-developed more open regime? And finally, we can also focus on the different social forces as to how they coalesce within themselves, and how they try to obtain a share of this gradually-expanded power. There are some indications showing that the cleavage of political forces seems to gradually develop along the ethnic lines of mainlanders and Taiwanese. If this is the case, how may this new development affect future development of this new regime?

Speaking of institutionalization of this new regime, let me just mention several topics: how does the dominant ruling party cope wiht the growing opposition parties? How does it change the constitutional framework to accommodate these new socio-economic demands from the general public? What is the implication of the upcoming open election for the formation of political forces? And lastly, for those people who are interested in studying political economy and development, these newly-emerging economic forces also imply that the old pattern of government-business relationship in Taiwan may be in the process of gradual, sometimes even dramatic, changes. These are some topics that people might want to study. In addition, a more recent focus is on the interaction between Taiwan and China, the People's Republic of China. It can be put in the context of interaction between rivalry regimes in a divided nation. we have already witnessed the integration of the East and West Germany, and the interaction between North and South Korea seems to be under way. How should we approach the study of PRC-ROC interactions? Are there similarities or, perhaps, some great differences? Similarities, because we are dealing with divided nations and the division along the ideological lines, and also along the geographical lines. The differences are due to the fact China is very large while Taiwan is small. This kind of asymmetric dyadic relationship does play a significant role in the interactions between PRC and ROC.

Speaking of this, let me also mention that Professor Samuel Wu and I are organizing a conference supported by the CCK foundation, which will be held on October 3rd and 4th at Taxes AM University. This entire conference is focused on the communications across the Taiwan Strait. The subtitle is historical and theoretical perspective. The purposes of it, to some extent, also reflects our ideas of how we can take advantages of different approaches in political science in general, for a deeper understanding of this interaction. There are thirteen papers to be presented. We divide them into three different sectors: (1) How the domestic factors in both Taiwan and Mainland China affect their own ways of treating each other. (2) Examining regional and international contexts to see how both the factors may affect or constrain, or even facilitate the interaction between China and Taiwan. (3) examining the pattern of interaction between the PRC and the ROC in the past. And in this approach, we take some historical perspective to see if this past pattern of interaction to each other continues or is subject to some domestic change. Is the past telling us something about the future, or is this past just going to be past? These are some general topics we will examine. Under each topic, we include political, economic, and social factors within a historical approach. We hope this approach will shed more light on the study of PRC-ROC relationships. Let me conclude with some final remarks. Even if we treat Taiwan as a curious case per se, which provides us with some

very precious information, that still will not prevent us from putting the case of Taiwan into much broader comparative and historical studies.

Nathan: Thank you!

I am going to make my remarks briefly. It seems to me that the question is, as Professor Huang said, why should American political scientists place any priority on studying this little country or place called Taiwan? I want to concentrate on how I would answer that question for political participation and political culture. If you start by looking at the state of the art, which we are supposed to do, one has to admit that, as far as I know, American political scientists do not know very much about the state of the art of studies in Taiwan on political participation and political culture. Probably, Edwin Winckler knows more than anybody else. I may know more than most American political scientists about it, but I am aware that I know very little about it. I know quite a bit about the work done by the "Hu Fu Mafia". Besides that, I am aware that there are good survey research projects at Cheng-Chi University, in the INPR, in the Public Opinion Research Foundation, and by the Democracy Foundation. But I have not seen those data. I do not know how those studies have been done. One reason for that is that the data of all those studies, and the Hu Fu material as well, have not yet been described in English as far as I am aware. So one has to look at it in

Chinese, and who has time to do that? I do not know anybody who is not a Chinese who has had time to do it. Although the state of the art is something that American political scientists do not know, I think the state of the art is very highly advanced. That is my impression. And hence this becomes the first answer to why should American political scientists study Taiwan You already have a tremendous body of data, sophisticated analyses, surveys that have been carried out for ten or twenty years since Hu Fu started.

Now if we look at those materials, what we are going to find? First, with regard to participation, participation literature is based very heavily on West type political systems, especially the U.S.A. Now we are in a new world in which in recent years, maybe the last five years, political scientists have started to do surveys around all the world: in Latin America, in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, a little bit in Mainland China. The survey data are becoming rich. I certainly do not have an overview of all the surveys. But I would guess that what the Taiwan case can offer in the context of the worldwide developmet of surveys is first of all that the surveys done in Taiwan are technically excellent, which may or may not be true of the surveys done elsewhere so far. And they are rather complete in what they cover. I have seen a survey in the Soviet Union, where for some reason the investigators concentrated on a lot of trivial things, waste from the viewpoint of basic social science. But in Taiwan,

you have a lot of fundamental things that have been looked out in the surveys.

Moreover what you have in Taiwan is a system which has two very important characteristics from a theoretical point of view. One is that it is culturally Chinese. It is so far the only culturally Chinese political system where we have an extensive body of survey data. That is important, given the importance of Chinese culture as one of the three or four main types of culture in the world. And secondly, it is a system in democratizing transition, a system in which a competitive party system is taking shape. It is rare to have the opportunity to have survey-based data to track individual participatory behaviors in a party system which is taking form, as opposed to a party system where you start to do surveys after the party system is already in existence, like the U.S.A. So one very obvious potential finding from participation-oriented surveys from Taiwan, which Chu Yunhan has been looking at, is exactly the shaping-up of party identification, one of the major variables in American survey research. We can watch that variable form in Taiwan. It may be the first opportunity to watch party identification in formation. We can also watch issue dimensions in formation. My own understanding of this is heavily influenced by the National Taiwan University stuff because that is the stuff I know the most about. As a political system begins to open up, the issues that were suppressed come into the public arena. How is that

issue dimension shaped? Will it be a left-right dimension or a Chinese-Taiwanese identity dimension? Or how the repertory of conventional versus unconventional participation takes shape in a transitional process.

Another interesting subfield refers to the importance of local factions. what role do they play as the political system becomes more competitive? The mobilizing and demobilizing role of these local factions can be compared to the mobilizing and demobilizing role of the other kinds of political institutions, like parties, in other countries. So I think when it comes to political participation, the Taiwan case offers one of the most important cases for broadening the literature and seeing the process that we missed in the West take place.

When it comes to political culture, as I already said, this is the first chance to measure the so-called Chinese political culture empirically. Now there is lot of literature, Pye and Solomon and so on , about what Chinese political culture is. But nobody has actually studied it through surveys. This is the chance to study it, and by using the analytical capabilities that surveys give us, we can study how cultural attributes vary by gender, income, education, occupation, region, and so forth. We can make a rough tradition-modern dimension even in a synchronic survey, by dividing up the population. You can see whether some people are more Chinese type of political culture. And whether or not they have a more Chinese type of political culture. And then as

you accumulate surveys over time, you track important attributes over time, you can see how those attributes change. And if you can gain access to other parts of the Chinese cultural area like the mainland, where in some of that area development is much less advanced, you can even make a comparative study because all of Taiwan is relatively modernized, and there are parts of mainland where you can see more traditional attributes. We can look at how cultural attributes influence participation and how participation influences the cultural attributes. We can test the materialism/post-materialism hypothesis in a Chinese setting. So with regard to participation and culture in conclusion, it seems to me the issue here is not to get to the cutting-edge of theory, but to do basic pure science, pure social science, to get to the classic questions, and use the two attributes that Taiwan has to research those classic questions. One of the two attributes is that Taiwan is a very excellent social science community that has already been collecting these data, while the other is those special characteristics of the Taiwan case that it is a Chinese case, and a transitional case. Those attributes make a very cost-effective thing for American political scientists to look at to broaden their understanding of these phenomena.

Now we have ten minutes for comments from the floor.

Floor Discussion:

Chu Yun-han:

Lucian Pye has succinctly described the emerging core issues for the discipline as a whole as the crisis of the authoritarian regime and the democratic transition. Although each panelist has to some extent touched on these important issues, I think we have not really covered them in full spectrum. When we characterize the regime transition process in Taiwan, there are a number of historically unique aspects. One is that this transition is inevitably coupled with the crisis of the state. Due to some historical reasons, the regime was transplanted from Mainland to Taiwan. Its consolidation process was coupled with a state reconstitution process. So when the regime legitimacy is called into question, so is the state legitimacy itself. In addition, the sovereign status of Taiwan is not formally constituted in the international community, which adds more complexity to the regime transition process. I think the Taiwan case brings back a forgotten tradition in the analysis of macroprocess in political economy. The emphasis in the new wave of democratization literature on the contingency, the game-theoretic institutionalism is a welcome correction of earlier emphasis on the political economy, as O'Donnell and others have done so successfully in their analysis of the B-A regime. But now it is simply dismissed as a deterministic historical-structural approach. A more balanced approach would be a conditional and embedded contingency, by which I mean that although elite strategies are crucial, nontheless the strategies are determined under the constraints of certain his-

torical-structural opportunities. Haggard and Kaufman have a forthcoming piece with a quite neat typology bringing back the political economy to balance that account. I don't know if Stephen will jump into the discussion here, and talk about how does the authoritarian regime, which was founded on an institutionalized development strategy, has successfully pursued a development strategy which is politically exclusionary but economically exclusionary, and hence enable the incumbent elite to pretty much craft and engineer the process of transition, and try to control the outcomes of the processs.

Stephen Haggard [Harvard University]:

I will say something about the party system. I just take issue with Andy (Nathan). Or put it differently rather than taking issue. I will say something complementary to the studies of attitude and voting behavior, particularly about how the party structure is going to sort itself out. That can be looked at both angles: [not only] what the social bases of individual parties are, but also how the party structure affects terms of competition among groups, the opportunities groups organize and exercise influence. I think there are a couple of transitions which at least provide interesting comparative material I am always fishing for. Now you have a transformation of one party system like Mexico. Clearly the possibility for groups to exercise influences is driven by whether the KMT will maintain its dominance in the

electoral arena, or whether an [opposition] party can form an alternative that constitutes a power block that is adequate to actually challenge the KMT at all. And I think, [there is also] the question about whether its outcome [will be like] a Japanese system which has a permanent dominant KMT, an electoral machine, and the permanent opposition. Those are the type of issues that I think should be addressed as structural issues about party institution.

Nathan:

If somebody like Alfred Stepan asks me why should I go to Taiwan and look at the Taiwan case -- I have so many friends in Latin America curious about that -- I will tell him probably that first of all, this point won't be enough, but you might say this is not like these African countries which are caught up in some tide of world change, this is an internal process, which has been building up for twenty years. It is not an international contingency, so you can study an internal dynamic. It is the only Leninist structural system that has entered into a transition, hence it offers a unique guideline to how Leninist parties may go. It is the only culturally Chinese system that enters into transition. So that is a factor. Now you have all the survey research which you can use to look at that factor. It is the electoral arena that has been particularly important in this transition because there is a preexisting arena you can look at how it

functions in the transition. It is not added on in the last minute. There is a rich literature here, unlike the participation and culture literatures that I was reported on before that is almost nothing is English. There is a very gook literature in English, including Yun-han, T. J. Chen, Winckler, Hun-mao Tien, and so on, that a person like stepan can read to, not only get the story but to be briefed on a lively debate, which existed. And that lively debate, as I read, is centered around the issue like a kind of socio-economic preconditions argument versus elite actors argument. So where the stepan group has emphasized the importance of elite tactics, the Taiwan case offers a very good-not a test exactly--but a testing ground for them to go and read the debate, and get into the debate about how the conditions like economic development and so forth interact with the elite decisions. How the succession crisis around Chiang Ching-Kuo interacted into that debate, and then finally it is a special issue, somebody mentions, I think Steve's [Chen] divided nations issue that has played a very important role in shaping the Taiwan transition, and which, unlike the other divided nations, is tied up with the ethnic identity dimension in Taiwan. So I will use those arguments to apply to the NSF [National Science Foundation] for a grant to study the Taiwan transition. They have a bunch of Latin Americanists on the panel. These are the arguments that I will use for the importance of this case.

Qian Yu-jun [Oxford University]:

I think you are right in saying what is important to study Taiwan. The Study of Taiwan is of course important for American political scientists, for them to look at real political stuff, political culture and so on. For Chinese, it is also important to learn what Taiwan's implication is for Hong Kong. In terms of political culture, I think, nowadays even is Britain we always face the argument that Chinese people are not qualified for democracy because Chinese traditional culture is not pro-democratic and very conservative. But if there is little solid data, they can only refer to history. Now, Taiwan for the first time can provide very solid data. I have read in Hong Kong some studies done locally and jointly with Doctor Chu. They have updated their surveys in recent years. On the one hand, the Hong Kong Chinese are still Chinese in terms of traditional culture, their attitude to life being somewhat conservative. But on the other hand, in certain political aspects, they are now more and more moving toward liberal view and more active in politics, of course, through politicization, socialization. Taiwan is now moving toward a multi-party system. It's the ending of single party dominance. What will all these imply for Mainland China? China is certainly a huge country. It is a different regime, at different level of development. The Chinese government always says that the vast majority of silent people is not necessarily pro-

democratic. Now we can say that's not true. For those areas like Shanghai and coastal area, they are more like Taiwan and Hong Kong than the rest of China. And even for the rest of China, it is hard to say whether the peasants have not got the kind of commonly shared sense of justice or genuine demand for liberal democracy. So, surveys of the empirical studies in Taiwan are of enormous importance for China as well. And so are they for American political scientist interested in China studies. I do appreciate those people showing their respect for Chinese people in certain ways. It is right to respect foreign culture, but it is not necessary to say that what government in that country says stands for the majority of people. Thank you.

Shin Chih-yu [National Taiwan University]:

All this discussion reminds me as a political scientist of how chaotic and split this discipline is. Of course we can deconstruct political science, and reconstruct our experience like we seem to be doing here. Then we have Professor Huang gave us an impression that political science actually stands on an empire by including Taiwan simply as a case. I can not agree more with Professor Nathan's empathy for basic research, looking for basic things that anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have done a lot, looking for raw data through coding and interviewing. Things we can do include interviews like in psychology and anthropology, which political scientists are not used

to. It is important to find out how people react to political transition. What is the criteria used to evaluate politics, and those things can perhaps [be] reviewed in some kind of open-ended. As I understand, a lot of American political scientists are doing all these things in China. Very few Taiwan experts seem to be interested in this type of research, I guess. That is my impression. And I think we learn a lot just by talking to people. Just learning through talking, we political scientists as comparativ[ists] maybe should try to emphasize not only the way the analysts normally conceptualize the world, but also the way our readers conceptualize the world, to see through the perspectives of actors we are supposed to study. I think few have employed interviewing as an important technique. This is often ignored by political scientists.

Winckler:

My presentation left "political culture" to Andy, whose book "Chinese Democracy" is the most sophisticated discussion for modern China. I am curious what he thinks about the following problems that trouble me.

First, the most general problem concerns the question, what is a "cultural approach"? No doubt there are many possible, and many vivid versions. However most senior political scientists seem to have a "mentalist" concept of culture that should be outdated in the social sciences and anyway yields bad predictions

in the real world. There are intellectual-hitorical, psycho-cultural and cultural-anthropological versions of "mentalism", but they are all inadequate. The wrong model is that ideas are buried in the back of somebody's head, and then "expressed" through individual behavior. The right model is that culture is continuously constructed through social interaction between people in their social positions.

Second, applied to China in general, the intellectual-historical version of the "mentalist" fallacy produces an industry of people falsely claiming to follow Max Weber in using Confucianism to "explain" East Asian development. The psycho-cultural version gives you Lucian Pye -- indispensable exploration of essential themes, but with antique theory and no methodological controls. Put them together and you got Samuel Huntington's 1984 prediction that in Chinese societies the main obstacle to democratization is Confucianism, which will delay if not prevent democratization there. In 1991, even after Tianamen (and a private demurral from me), Huntington has reiterated this position, citing Andy's book. I wonder what Andy think's of that now? Actually, hearing the Tiananmen demonstrators, I thought you were right: those people really didn't know what democracy is, they really did still have overtones of state-dependent literati, and they certainly didn't know how to promote democratization.

Third, apply this to Taiwan in particular and you got Pye's

explanation of why Taiwan is democratizing away -- because it is no longer Confucian. To give Pye credit, he does adduce some reasons why Confucianism should have decline on postwar Taiwan. However, it is pretty hard to swallow that Confucianism suddenly perished on Taiwan where the Nationalist government desperately combatted it. In any case, the only way to make the argument is to measure the strength of Confucianism over time on both Taiwan and the mainland. This brings me to Andy's presentation: I am worried that survey research asking Western questions will not capture much about Chinese political culture. I disagree with "cultural determinism", but since it is so influential, it needs to be refuted empirically.

Personally I suspect that , culturally, many Taiwanese were "read for democracy" in 1945 -- look at the landlords' lobbying under the Japanese, or at their performance in the earlier postwar provincial assembly, or at the self-organization of civil society after 2,28. Probably there were enough such Taiwanese to run a democracy. If India could do it, so could Taiwan. This Conference Group should convene a panel on these issues.

Shi Chi-yu:

Just for argument's sake, let me speak for Professor Pye. I understand your frustration, I once asked him how he responds to people's criticism. He said that, after a while people will know that you are right. In other words, he has no intention to deal

with methodology. He relies on insight. I thinking that his argument is not really democracy rises on the perish of Confucianism.

If we take his argument seriously, we see that his argument is really that Confucian personality of the Chinese National[ist] leaders disallow them to extend their power to the economic sphere. If they want to prove their moral purity, that loss of China was not their responsibility, then they have to prove that they are not corrupt. If we push the argument further, then we can say that Nationalists use the constitution as their source of legitimacy. But constitutionalism is about limited governmet. You can't have a government with a highest moral power while it is limited by constitutionalism. So, the source of legitimacy psychologically constrains the Nationalists from the traditional style of ruling. Democracy is precisely the result of the paradox of confucianism in Taiwan, not of the decline of Confucianism. This is Pye's line of argument.

APPENDIX

Edwin A. Winckler

INTRODUCTION

How can Taiwan studies contribute to political science? The panel organizers have identified some subfields that existing studies of Taiwan illuminate (mostly political economy), and assigned three of them to me. This is a good approach and I will respond to it. However I must begin with some reservations.

First, one must note the tension between "Taiwan studies" and "political science". In practice, some cooperation in mobilizing Taiwan materials and marketing them to academic disciplines is necessary. In theory, however, there should be no such thing as "Taiwan studies". As Przeworski and Teune explain in The logic of comparative social inquiry, the focus of comparison is not countries but processes, and the purpose of comparison is to find out whether these processes differ under different circumstances.

Second, if we are going to start from APSA subfields, there is some use in sticking to the APSA'S, and in considering them all. The APSA has several dozen subfields, and in reviewing the list I

could find only one to which it was hard to see how Taiwan could contribute (Western Europe). Many subfields, such as policymaking or public administration, remind one of what remains to be done in studying Taiwan . Other subfields promise other types of contributions -- for example at these meetings there is a session on Oriental Political Theory.

Third, we may not want to start from APSA subfields. The main contribution to this political scientists of studying East Asia has been to force me to put these specialized subfields together into a broader and more robust framework -- the "multisectoral, multilevel, multi-interpretive" approach I sketch in Contending approaches to the political economy of Taiwan. That is how I will organize my remarks.

SUPRANATIONAL

At the supranational level, Taiwan raises at least three themes -- globalism, comparativism and sovereignty.

Globalism. One of the subfields on which the panel organizers asked me to comment is "development theory". My comment is that the East Asian cases show the futility of merely national theories of development. A main theme of most of the pieces in Contending approaches is the tremendous weight of global processes in anything that happens on Taiwan. To me one of the first points that Taiwan makes to comparative politics is that, regardless of subfield, one must start from an explicit

formulation of global processes, even if one's purpose is to study differing national reactions to them. Most APSA subfields still lack a global perspective, which is strange for a discipline trying to achieve systemic closure. It is all the more odd given the accelerating intensification of global integration in all sectors.

Comparison. For comparing national processes, the relevant context is suprantional -- one must specify the place in global dynamics of the particular national process one is studying. Statist comparativists claim that globalism doesn't explain anything: if "similarly situated" countries face the same global environment but respond differently, the explanation must be statism not globalism. However, "similarly situated" assumes that conclusion. The external situation of any two countries will always differ in significant ways. These differences contribute more to differences in outcomes than statists allow. Globalism is the most useful way to organize these supranational differences. From this point of view Taiwan is not one case but a cornucopia of cases, because of the many drastic changes in its external situation.

Sovereignty. If, at the supranational level, postwar Taiwan is a case of something, what is it a case of? One answer is that, at least for military-political processes, Taiwan is a distinctive case of incomplete sovereignty. Taiwan has most of the de facto attributes of sovereignty but little of its de jure recognition -- the opposite of the African cases. Taiwan's failure at formal diplo-

macy underlines that states derive from inter-state relations, which means that globalism precedes statism and statism is supranational before it is national. Taiwan's success at practical diplomacy shows something about where the world is going -- from simple to complex interdependence. Taiwan also shows that such theoretical abstractions have practical application. I have been arguing for some years that both Taiwan and China should junk outmoded western concepts of sovereignty in favor of more sophisticated formulations, including some that are traditionally Chinese. I am amazed and pleased to see Ambassador Lilley publicly taking this line.

NATIONAL

At the national level, Taiwan also raises at least three themes -- statism, institutions and policy.

Statism. So far Taiwan's main contribution to political science has been to provide political-economists with examples of statism. No doubt it is useful for comparativists to have a stick with which to beat sociocentrism. I am impressed by Steph Haggard's command of national cases but underwhelmed by his conclusion that the role of the Nationalist state in Taiwan's development was to "reduce transaction costs". I am impressed by Robert Wade's command of sectoral histories, but baffled that an anthropologist would advanced such a lopsidedly statist account. In any case, how many more times can comparativists

pretend to have just discovered that East Asian societies have strong states? How many times can they prop up some sociocentric straw man and announce that Taiwan might demolish it, if only area specialists would do enough research to provide comparativists with the necessary materials?

Institutions. Another subfield listed by the organizers of this panel is institutions. To be meaningful, statism must be institutionally specific. Taiwan's contribution should be to fill out the range of East Asian cases. This requires some elaboration of comparative institutional analysis, particularly the interplay of formal organizations and informal network. This in turn requires combining interest in comparing cases with the capability and willingness to research them. For example, both Alice Amsden and Robert Wade quote my judgement (written in 1976!) that we do not know enough about how the Nationalist state actually worked adequately to categorize its institutional makeup. Both go on to resolve the issue on a priori grounds -- Amsden stresses the government technocracy, Wade the party apparatus. My view is that the Chiang system was too Leaderist to be fully technocratic, and as much security-based as party-based.

Policies. Speaking of how things actually work. one subfield not listed by the organizers of this panel is "the policy process". This is significant, because empirical study of how particular policies were decided and implemented remains one of the

biggest lacks in studies of Taiwan. They are the only way to answer the institutional questions raised above. They are one of the main areas in which Taiwan can contribute to comparative politics, including analysis of the prospects for marketization of socialist economies like the Soviet Union and China. No doubt our Taiwan colleagues will soon fill this gap. Normative studies of what policies to adopt have recently blossomed on Taiwan. Partly for this reason, however, empirical policy studies are off to a slow start.

SUBNATIONAL

At the subnational level, Taiwan also raises at least three themes -- regime, transition and localism.

Regime. Statists have displayed surprisingly little curiosity about the underpinnings of the stability and autonomy of the Nationalist state, willing to believe that it hangs from supranational skyhooks or emerges from national gunbarrels. Consequently they have overlooked its subnational foundations, an involuted standoff between Nationalist state and Taiwanese society that reveals the power of both. As O'Donnell has noted, the form of forces it is trying to control. The problem Taiwan poses is how to identify the social origins of state policies that are what Carl Friedrich called "anticipated reactions" to social demands. The fact that these interests could not be publicly articulated does not mean that they did not exist, or that they did not

influence Nationalist policies. Some of what looks state-centric is ultimately sociocentric.

Transition. A third political science subfield assigned me is transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Democratization is an assertion of society against the state. Taiwan may be an even more extreme case than Japan in which installation from outside and long tenure in office give a ruling party such dominance over policies that alternation of parties is unlikely. It may also be another case in which the public is content to express itself by raising and lowering the dominant party's winning majority. Westerners tend to see a drastic change from an authoritarian regime that repressed social aspirations to a democratic regime that will somehow fulfill them. Easterners aware of accommodation between state and society through informal networks even under authoritarianism might see only a modest shift from informal accommodation under another.

Localism. Localism affects the supranational level too. When transition accelerated in the mid-1980s, my old friend Yingmau Kao wrote an article saying that a formerly three person game between the Nationalists, Communists and Americans has now become a four person game including the Taiwanese. My old friend Andy Nathan wrote an article explaining that the communists now held a losing hand and that democratization had derailed Communist reunification overtures. I was struck by these articles because I had said almost exactly the same thing in

almost exactly the same words ten years before, in a policy paper for Dick Solomon at Rand. My point is partly that the increase in the supranational relevance of subnational localism began earlier. However my point is also that even under authoritarianism the Taiwanese were already a silent player and the communists already held a losing hand. Democratization gave Taiwanese their own voice, but the other players had always weighed the Taiwanese heavily in their calculations and strategies. Again, the transition is not from the absence to presence of something, but from implicit to explicit expression.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we should note the situation of professional power struggle under which the discourse in which we are engaged is being constructed. Three things concern me.

First, I would like to think that earlier cohorts of foreigners, ranging from Fred Riggs and Allen Whiting to Andy Nathan and Ed Winckler, can continue to contribute to this topic. However I suspect that we will soon be superseded by younger cohorts of Asian-American and East Asian scholars. Political science is in for a real treat when it sees the work of Hu Fu's Taita Mafia, including that of such brilliant young scholars as Chu Yun-han and Ch'en Ming-t'ong.

Second, I would like to think that academic disciplines will progress by gradually synthesizing the contending ideological

approaches within them. In fact however disciplines mostly overdo first one approach and then another. In the 1960s American political science overdid liberal socio-centrism, in the 1980s it overdid conservative statism. In the 1970s globalism provided a critical alternative, but its association with radicalism prevented it from becoming mainstream. The 1990s may suffer from its continuing exclusion.

Third, I would like to see the comparative literature contain a fair reflection of the area-studies research on which it is based. However, comparativists are more likely to mine the literature for facts to support their own arguments, while ignoring the theoretical arguments that East Asianists themselves advance.

I hope this Conference Group will do otherwise and I wish it well. Otherwise the contribution of Taiwan studies to political science will half-baked examples of preconceived ideas.